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RECENT CASES
author concluded that the court was bringing the situation within the operation of that
part of the statute of frauds (represented in Washington by RCW 64.04.010, [RRS
§ 10550]) which requires every conveyance of real estate or of an interest therein to
be by deed, and that in reaching the result by this avenue the court was supported by
precedent in many jurisdictions. If this was the view of the court, the Carkonen case
appears to be inconsistent with the Pederson case which held that RCW 19.36.010
[RRS §5825] was controlling in this type of case. In the Mele case the Pederson case
was cited for this position, and the interpretation given that statute was quite different
from that given it in the Carkonen opinion. In the latter case the court mentioned
certain prior Washington cases, stating that the "fraud perpetrated by the agent in
those cases distinguishes them from the present case." If there can be a distinction
between the Carkonen decision and the two recent cases, the quoted portion from that
opinion is the apparent answer. It seems questionable, however, whether this is a valid
distinction, when the ultimate question for decision is whether an agency relationship
was created by virtue of the oral agreement.
Although the Carkonen case may possibly stand alone on its facts, the reasoning
of the Mele and Pederson cases appears inconsistent and seems preferable. The fact
that fraud is not present may be a means of reaching the result that no constructive
trust could arise, but it does not seem a valid reason for a different interpretation of
RCW 19.36.010 [RRS § 5825]. The literal interpretation of that statute in the Carkonen case might easily further the perpetration of fraud upon an innocent landowner
or prospective purchaser. The court quoted with approval in the Mele case a passage
from Rathbun v. McLay, 76 Conn. 308, 56 A. 511 (1903), which sums up this line of
reasoning adequately: "To adopt the defendant's contention would be to hold the
monstrous doctrine that an agent employed to do anything concerning land could with
impunity be as dishonest as he pleases, and cheat and defraud his principal to his
heart's content, if it chanced that his agency was not evidenced in writing." It is to be
hoped that in the future the Washington court will adhere to the principles advanced
in the Pederson and Mele cases.
JAMES B. MITCHELL
Statute of Frauds-Sufficiency of Memorandum. Action on a contract whereby P
agreed to sell and D to buy 4200 day-old poults. Such a contract is unenforceable
unless a memorandum signed by D is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the
statute of frauds. RCW 63.04.050 (1) [RRS § 5836-4(1)]. P relied on a printed contract form, filled in by P but unsigned by either party, and a postal card signed by D
on which D wrote, "Dear Mr. Grant: I have decided to not raise any turkeys this
year so will you please cancel my order? . . ." P contended that the word "order"
incorporated by reference the terms of the form filled in by P. Judgment for P. On
appeal, Held: Reversed. Grant v. Anvil, 39 Wn. 2d 722, 238 P. 2d 393 (1951).
The decision turns on the construction of the reference in the postal card to the
"order." The Court cited RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 208, Illus. 9 where a distinction
is drawn between a written memorandum of an agreement and the intangible agreement which is evidenced by the memorandum. According to the RESTATEMENT, a
letter referring to the "agreement between us" would constitute a sufficient memorandum if the reference is to the writing, but not if the reference is to the intangible
agreement. Whether the reference is to the writing or to the intangible agreement is
a question of interpretation. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS, supra. Here, the Court said
there was nothing to indicate that the postal card referred to an extrinsic writing.
When the seller has filled out a printed contract form, unsigned by the buyer, and
the buyer later writes to the seller making reference to the "order" and acknowledges
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its existence, one line of cases holds that "order" refers to the intangible agreement.
Wagner-White Co. v. Holland Co-op Ass=., 222 Mich. 58, 192 N.W. 552 (1923). The
other line of cases holds that "order" refers to the writing. In Kahn v. Schoen Silk
Corp., 147 Md. 516, 128 Atl. 359 (1925), the seller's agent took an order for goods
which the buyer did not sign. Later, the buyer wrote requesting partial cancellation of
the order. The seller refused to cancel, wherefore the buyer wrote, "We are compelled
to cancel our entire order." The court held that the letter incorporated the written
"order" by reference. In Louisville Asphalt Varnish Co. v. Lorick, 29 S.C. 533, 8 S.E.
8 (1888), the defendant wrote, "Don't ship paint ordered through your salesman. We
have concluded not to handle it." This was held to incorporate the unsigned written
order. In Knobel & Bloom v. Cortell-Markson Co., 122 Me. 511, 120 Atl. 721 (1923),
the word "order" in "Please cancel the order given your representative,. . ." was found
as a fact to refer to the written unsigned order. Morris Furniture Co. v. Braverman,
230 N.E. 346, 210 Iowa 946 (1930), held the word "order" in "Will you please hold
our order of Sept. 17, until further notice?" referred to the writing.
Jones-Scott Co. v. Ellensburg Milling Co., 108 Wash. 73, 183 Pac. 113 (1919), the
Washington case most nearly in point, held that a sufficient memorandum arose from
the exchange of correspondence concerning a sale of wheat. Plaintiff had written two
letters to defendant in which the terms of the sale had been set forth. Defendant's
second reply letter concluded, "If you will give me time I will take the wheat bought
from you in August." The Court said, "We think there can be no doubt that the letter
refers to the contract mentioned . . ." by the plaintiff in its letters. It appears that the
reference in the principal case is as direct a reference to the unsigned written contract
as is the reference in the Jones-Scott case.
In view of the Court's admission that the use of the word "order" is a question of
interpretation, it seems that "order" ought to be construed as a reference to the written
"order" rather than a reference to the intangible order. The facts of this case do not
present the slightest suggestion that fraud is being practiced by P; yet, the holding in
the case permits the buyer to breach his contract and to use the statute of frauds as a
shield to avoid liability to the seller. The courts have consistently said that they will
not allow the defense of the statute of frauds when in so doing it becomes an instrument of fraud.
ELDON C. PARR
as a Partnership or as a Corporation.
Taxation- Limited Partnership -Taxable
A, B and C, brothers, having for years operated their business as a general partnership and later as a corporation, formed a limited partnership under the Washington
Limited Partnership Act of 1869, RCW 25.12.010 et seq. [RRS § 9966 et seq.], with
themselves as general partners and their ten adult children as the limited partners. The
articles of co-partnership provided: the management was to be vested in the general
partners; upon the death or retirement of a general or limited partner, the remaining
general partners were to have the right to continue the business; the interest of a
limited partner was to be transferable only with the approval of the general partners;
and the general partners were to have the right to admit additional limited partners
upon the same footing as the original ones. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue
contended that the enterprise constituted an "association" within the meaning of the
Internal Revenue Code and was therefore taxable as a corporation. Held: Petitioner
does not bear such a resemblance to an association or operate effectively as such to
justify inclusion of it in that category for tax purposes. Western Construction Co. v.
CIR, 14 T. C. 453, Non-acquiesced, 1950-2 Cum. BULL. 6, aff'd without opinion. 191 F.
2d 401 (C.C.A. 9th 1951).

